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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Justin Ryan Moss timely appeals from three orders which revoked his probation 
in docket numbers 38541, 38590, and 38600. In all three cases, Mr. Moss argues that 
the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process of law when it refused to augment 
the record with transcripts of various hearings. In all three cases, Mr. Moss argues that 
the respective district court's abused their discretion when they revoked his probation. 
In docket number 38541, Mr. Moss also argues that the district court abused its 
discretion when it failed to reduce his sentence pursuant his oral I.C.R. 35 motion due to 
the various mitigating factors. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In 2006, docket number 38600, Mr. Moss pleaded guilty to the charge of issuing 
checks without funds. (#38600 R., pp.26-27, 43.) Thereafter, the district court entered 
an order withholding judgment and placed Mr. Moss on probation. (#38600 R., p.47-
53.) 
In 2008, docket number 38590, Mr. Moss pleaded guilty to the charge of grand 
theft. (#38590 R., pp.39.) Thereafter, the district court entered a judgment of conviction 
and imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with five years fixed, but suspended the 
sentence and placed Mr. Moss on probation. (#38590 R., pp.39-45.) Additionally, the 
district court ordered this sentence to be served concurrently with Mr. Moss' sentence in 
docket number 38590. (#38590 R., p.40.) 
The district court also violated Mr. Moss' probation in docket number 38600, 
based on the new conviction. (10/23/08 Tr., p.4, Ls.10-15, p.25, Ls.1-21; #38600 
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R., pp.91-93.) Thereafter, the district court revoked the withheld judgment, imposed a 
unified sentence of three years, with eighteen months fixed, but suspended the 
sentence and placed Mr. Moss on probation. (#38600 R., pp.91-93.) 
In 2009, docket number 38541, Mr. Moss pleaded guilty to two counts of forgery. 
(#38541 R., p.65.) Thereafter, the district court imposed two unified sentences of ten 
years, with five years fixed, but retained jurisdiction. (#38541 R., pp.65-69.) 
Additionally, these two sentences were ordered to be served concurrently with one 
another, and concurrently with the sentence in docket number 38600. (#38541 
R., p.66.) Mr. Moss successfully completed his period of retained jurisdiction 
(hereinafter, rider) and was placed on probation. (#38541 R., pp. 77-83.) 
In docket numbers 38600 and 38590, the State filed two motions alleging 
probation violations primarily based on the forgery allegations contained in docket 
number 38541. (#38600, R. pp.102-104; #38590 R., pp.62-64.) In both cases, 
Mr. Moss' probation was revoked and he was ordered on a rider in each cases to run 
concurrent to one another and concurrent with the rider ordered in docket number 
38541. (#38590 R., pp.88-90; #38600 R., pp.126-127.) Mr. Moss successfully 
completed this period of retained jurisdiction and was placed on probation. (#38590 
R., pp.94-98; # 38600 R., pp.134-138.) 
After a period of probation, the State filed various motions alleging that Mr. Moss 
had violated his probation, all of which were based on the same conduct. (# 38541 
R., pp.90-92; #38590 R., pp.101-103; #38600 R., pp.141-143.) A probation violation 
evidentiary hearing was held in docket number 38541, and the district court found that 
Mr. Moss had violated various terms of his probation when he moved to California 
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without appropriate authorization. (#38541 R., pp.120-122; see generally 02/01/11 Tr.)1 
Based on the district court's finding that Mr. Moss violated his probation in docket 
number 38541, Mr. Moss was collaterally estopped from contesting the State's 
probation violation allegations in docket numbers 38541 and 38600. (#38541 
R., pp.130-137, 140-141; #38600 R., pp.170-177, 180-181.) 
At the probation violation disposition hearing, in docket number 38541, Mr. Moss 
made a request for a sentence reduction, which was denied by the district court. 
(02/08/11 Tr., p.44, Ls.18-25; #38541 R., pp.120-122.) Thereafter, Mr. Moss' probation 
was revoked in all three cases. (#38541 R., pp.120-122; #38590 R., pp.142-143; 
#38600 R., pp.182-183.) Mr. Moss timely appeals the revocation of his probation in all 
three cases.2 (#38541 R., pp.125-127; #38590 R., pp.147-149; #38600 R., pp.185-
187.) 
On appeal, Mr. Moss' appellate counsel filed a motion to augment and suspend 
the briefing schedule, wherein appellate counsel requested that the record on appeal be 
augmented with various transcripts. (Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing 
Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof, (hereinafter, Motion to Augment), pp.1-6.) 
The State objected to Mr. Moss' request for the transcripts. (Objection to "Motion to 
Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof," 
1 The district court's February 10, 2011, Order Revoking Probation, Imposing Sentence, 
and Commitment erroneously states that Mr. Moss admitted to various probation 
violations. (#38541 R., p.121.) However, Mr. Moss contested the State's allegations, 
and a full evidentiary hearing was held. (see generally 02/01/11 Tr.) 
2 At the probation violation hearing held in docket number 38590 and 38600, Mr. Moss 
and his trial counsel both requested that the district court revoke his probation and 
impose the underlying sentences. (03/02/11 Tr., p.57, L.13 - p.58, L.21.) Therefore 
Mr. Moss' claims that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his 
probation and imposed an excessively harsh sentence are both made mindfully of the 
doctrine of invited error. 
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(hereinafter, Objection to Motion to Augment), pp.1-4.) Thereafter, the Idaho Supreme 
Court entered its Order Denying Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing 
Schedule, denying Mr. Moss' request for the transcripts. (Order Denying Motion to 




1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Moss due process and equal protection 
when it denied his Motion to Augment with the requested transcripts? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Moss' probation? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to reduce Mr. Moss' 
unified sentence of ten years, with five years fixed, in docket number 38541, 




The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Moss Due Process And Equal Protection When It 
Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The Requested Transcripts 
A. Introduction 
A long line of United States Supreme Court cases hold that it is a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause and equal protection clause to deny an 
indigent defendant access to transcripts of trial proceedings which are relevant to issues 
the defendant intends to raise on appeal. The only way a court can constitutionally 
preclude an indigent defendant access to a requested transcript is if the State can prove 
that the transcript is irrelevant to the appeal. 
In this case, Mr. Moss filed a Motion to Augment, requesting transcripts of 
various hearings, wherein he argued that, when determining whether to revoke 
probation, a district court can considered all of the hearings before and after sentencing. 
On appeal, Mr. Moss is challenging the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his request for 
transcripts of Hearing held on February 9, 2010, in docket number 38541, Probation 
Violation Hearing held on September 3, 2009, in docket numbers 38590 and 38600, 
Disposition Hearing held on September 17, 2009, in docket numbers 38590 and 38600, 
and Rider Review Hearing held on February 11, 2010 in all three cases. Mr. Moss 
asserts that the requested transcripts are relevant to the issues addressed at the 
probation revocation hearing because they occurred before and after sentencing, and 
the district court can, therefore, rely on its memory of those hearings when it decided to 
revoke Mr. Moss' probation. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court erred in denying his 
request. 
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B. The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Moss Due Process And Equal 
Protection When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The 
Requested Transcripts 
1. The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Moss With 
Access To The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Him Due Process 
Because He Cannot Obtain A Merit Based Appellate Review Of His 
Sentencing Claims 
The constitutions of both United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a 
criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; ID. CONST. art. 
I, §13. 
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); Cole 
v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts 
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due 
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair." 
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24 
(1981 ). 
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood, 
132 Idaho 88 (1998)). Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United 
States Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United 
States Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh v. State, 
Dept. of Health and Welfare ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221, 227 (1998) (citing 
Smith v. Idaho Dep't of Correction, 128 Idaho 768, 771 (1996)). 
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute. See 
I.C. § 19-2801. Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a transcript, 
the cost of such transcript must be created at county expense. I.C. § 1-1105(2); 
I.C. § 19-863(a). Idaho court rules also address this issue. Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2 
mandates the production of transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant. 
I.C.R. 5.2(a). Further, "[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding 
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before the court .... " Id. Idaho Criminal Rule 54.7 further enables a district court to 
"order a transcript to be prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from 
paying such a fee as provided by statute or law." I.C.R. 54.?(a). 
An appeal from an order revoking probation is an appeal of right as defined in 
Idaho Appellate Rule 11. An order revoking probation is an order "made after judgment 
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant." State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852 
(Ct. App. 1983) (citing to I.AR. 11). 
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of cases that directly 
address whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can 
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the 
relevant trial proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these 
cases. The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal 
protection clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent 
defendants and those with financial means is not tolerated. However, the second 
theme limits the states' obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for 
review. The states do not have to provide indigent defendants with everything they 
request. In order to meet the constitutional mandates of due process and equal 
protection, the states must provide indigent defendants with an appellate record unless 
some or all of the requested materials are unnecessary or frivolous. 
The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. Illinois 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
In that case, two indigent defendant's "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a 
certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript of the 
proceedings, be furnished them without cost." Griffin, 351 at 13. At that time, the State 
of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been sentenced to 
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death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase transcripts 
themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme Court was 
whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty defendants 
was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16. 
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich, 
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due 
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with 
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of 
justice in every American court"' Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty 
than on account of religion, race, or color." Id. The Supreme Court went on to hold as 
follows: 
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the 
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which 
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all 
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a 
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate 
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a 
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that 
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their 
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois 
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant. 
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious 
discriminations. 
Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted). In order to satisfy the constitutional 
mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be 
provided with a record which facilitates an effective merits-related appellate review. At 
the same time, the Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary 
in instances where a less expensive, yet adequate, alternative exists. Id. at 20. 
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In Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding 
in Griffin when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court 
be accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency. In 
that case, the State argued that the defendant had already received appellate review of 
his conviction by the Ohio appellate court. Bums, 360 U.S. at 257. The United States 
Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled that "once the State chooses to 
establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access 
to any phase of that procedure because of their poverty." Id. 'This principle is no less 
applicable where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase 
of its appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of 
that procedure solely because of his indigency." Id. 
In State v. Draper, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a 
procedure determining access to transcripts based on a frivolousness standard. "Under 
the present standard, ... , they must convince the trial judge that their contentions of 
error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary to prosecute their 
appeal." Draper, 372 U.S. 494. The Supreme Court first expanded upon its statement 
in Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent alternative is 
available, by adding a relevancy requirement when stating that "part or all of the 
stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the 
appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such 
circumstances." Id. at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised for 
appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts. The 
Court ultimately concluded that the issues raised by the defendant's could not be 
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adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial 
proceedings. Id. at 497-99. 
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971 ), extended the Griffin protections 
to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to 
prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on 
appeal. In doing so, it was held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument 
that he/she needs items to create a complete record on appeal. Id. at 195. If the State 
wants to deny the defendant's request, it is the State's burden to prove that the 
requested items are not necessary for the appeal. Id. 
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the 
Idaho Court of Appeals. See Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v. 
Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App. 
2007). 
An application of the foregoing rules to the facts of this case creates a situation 
analogous Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1863). In that case, a transcript was 
necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be dismissed without the 
transcript. Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81. Similarly in Idaho, an appellant must provide an 
adequate record or the appeal can be dismissed. "It is well established that an 
appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate 
court can review the merits of the claims of error, ... and where pertinent portions of the 
record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial 
court." State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Beck, 128 Idaho 
416, 422 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991 ); State v. 
Murinko, 108 Idaho 872, 873 (Ct. App. 1985); State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541 
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(Ct App. 1992)). If the transcripts are missing, but the record contains court minutes, 
that may be sufficient so that a "meaningful review of [an appellant's] claim is possible, 
although the Idaho Court of Appeals has "strongly suggest[ed] that appellate counsel 
not rely on the district court minutes to provide an adequate record for [that] Court's 
review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999). If Mr. Moss fails to 
provide the appellate court with the requested items, the legal presumption will apply 
and Mr. Moss' claims will not be addressed on their actual merits. If it is state action 
alone, which prevents him from access to the requested items, then such action is a 
violation of due process, as per Lane, and any such presumption should no longer 
apply. 
Additionally, the requested items are within an Idaho appellate court's scope of 
review. Transcripts of the various probation violation admission and dispositional 
hearings are relevant because Idaho appellate courts review ALL proceedings following 
sentencing when determining whether the court appropriately revoked probation. See 
State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When we review a sentence that 
is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will examine the entire 
record encompassing events before and after the original judgment. We base our 
review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events 
occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation." (emphasis 
added)). 
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both 
due process and equal protection under to deny indigent defendants transcripts of trial 
proceedings on appeal. The decision to deny Mr. Moss' Motion to Augment will render 
his appeal meaningless because it will be presumed that the missing transcripts support 
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the district court's order revoking his probation. This functions as a procedural bar to 
the review of Mr. Moss' appellate sentencing claims on the merits, and therefore, 
Mr. Moss should either be provided with the requested transcripts or the presumption 
should not be applied. 
2. The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Moss With 
Access To The Requested Transcript Has Denied Him Due Process 
Because He Cannot Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal 
In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
in the context of death penalty cases was selectively incorporated to the states through 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. In coming to this conclusion, the United State Supreme Court reasoned 
that the ability to be heard by counsel is so inextricable related to due process that the 
denial of counsel is tantamount to the denial of a hearing. Powell, 287 U.S. at 69. The 
Supreme Court also stated that under the facts of Powell "the necessity of counsel was 
so vital and imperative that the failure to make an effective appointment of counsel was 
likewise a denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment ... 
[to] hold otherwise would to ignore the fundamental postulate, already adverted to, 'that 
there are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free 
government which no member of the Union may disregard."' Id. at 71-72. 
In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, (1963), the United States Supreme Court 
relied on Griffin, supra, and is progeny and determined that the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants the 
right to counsel on appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the protection of 
Douglas was extended to the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal. 
According to the United State Supreme Court: 
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In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to counsel 
on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant has a right to 
counsel at trial would be a futile gesture unless it comprehended the right to 
effective assistance of counsel. 
Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397. 
The remaining issue is defining effective assistance of counsel. According to the 
United States Supreme Court, appellate counsel must make a conscientious 
examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made. 
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) held that the constitutional requirements 
of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an 
active advocate on behalf of his client .... [Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he 
support his client's interest's to the best of his ability." See a/so Banuelos v. State, 127 
Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995). In this case, the lack of access to the requested 
transcripts has prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination 
of the case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether 
there is an additional issue to raise, or whether there is a factual support either in favor 
of any argument made or either undercutting an argument. Therefore, Mr. Moss has 
not obtained review of the court proceedings based on the merits and was not provided 
with effective assistance of counsel in that endeavor. 
Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) (overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991)), the starting point of evaluating 
whether counsel renders effective assistance of counsel in a criminal action is the 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMNAL JUSTICE, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION. 
These standards still offer insight into the role and responsibilities of appellate counsel. 
Regarding appellate counsel, the standards state: 
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Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional 
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel, 
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect 
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence .... Counsel should 
advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or 
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a 
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance. 
Standard 4-8.3(b). In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate 
counsel neither can make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be 
presented on appeal, nor can appellate counsel consider all issues that might affect the 
district court's decision to revoke Mr. Moss' probation. Counsel is also unable to advise 
Mr. Moss on the probable role the transcripts may play in the appeal. 
Mr. Moss is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and effective 
assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to all of the relevant transcripts. 
Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Moss his constitutional right to due 
process which includes a right to the effective assistance of counsel in this appeal. 
Accordingly, appellate counsel should be provided with access to the requested 
transcripts and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any necessary 
supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of that review. 
11. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Moss' Probation 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Moss was found in violation of his probation for absconding to California. 
However, there were no new allegations indicating that Mr. Moss had committed any 
new crimes. When this is viewed in light of the mitigating factors, it supports the 
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conclusion that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked Mr. Moss' 
probation. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Moss' Probation 
Mr. Moss asserts that, given any view of the facts, the district court abused its 
discretion when it revoked his probation. When a defendant appeals from an order 
revoking probation this Court has utilized the following framework: 
The decision to revoke a defendant's probation on a suspended sentence 
is within the discretion of the district court. I.C. § 20-222. In a probation 
revocation proceeding, two threshold questions are posed: (1) did the 
probationer violate the terms of probation; and, if so, (2) should probation 
be revoked? State v. Case, 112 Idaho 1136 (Ct.App.1987). 
State v. Corder, 115 Idaho 1137, 1138 (Ct. App. 1989). 
Mr. Moss concedes that he violated the terms his probation. Accordingly, he only 
contests the district court's decision to revoke his probation. "A district court's decision 
to revoke probation will not be overturned on appeal absent a showing that the court 
abused its discretion." State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009) (citing State v. 
Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378, 381 (Ct. App. 1994)). "When a district court's discretionary 
decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to 
determine whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, 
acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards 
applicable to the specific choices before it, and reached its decision by an exercise of 
reason." State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing State v. Hedger, 
115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989)). 
"In deciding whether revocation of probation is the appropriate response to a 
violation, the court considers whether the probation is achieving the goal of 
rehabilitation and whether continued probation is consistent with the protection of 
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society." State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing State v. Jones, 123 
Idaho 315, 318 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558 (Ct. App. 1988)). "[l]f 
a probationer's violation of a probation condition was not willful, or was beyond the 
probationer's control, a court may not revoke probation and order imprisonment without 
first considering alternative methods to address the violation." Id. (citing Bearden v. 
Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672-73 (1983); Lafferty, 125 Idaho at 382-83)). ''Only if the trial 
court determines that alternatives to imprisonment are not adequate in a particular 
situation to meet the state's legitimate interest in punishment, deterrence, or the 
protection of society, may the court imprison a probationer who has made sufficient, 
genuine efforts to obey the terms of the probation order." Id. 
The State did not allege that Mr. Moss had committed any new crimes when it 
alleged he violated his probation. (#38541 R., pp.90-92; #38590 R., pp.101-103; 
#38600 R., pp.141-143.) Mr. Moss' various probation violations were based on his 
decision to move to California and his failure to make payments for his public defender's 
fees. (# 38541 R., pp.90-92; #38590 R., pp.101-103; #38600 R., pp.141-143.) At the 
probation violation evidentiary hearing, the State dismissed the failure to pay public 
defenders fees allegation. (02/01/11 Tr., p.31, Ls.11-24.) Mr. Moss probation was 
violated because he absconded. (02/01/11 Tr., p.62, L.1 - p.64, L.8.) Which Mr. Moss 
does not want to understate the seriousness of this probation violation; it is important to 
note that he did not commit any new crimes. Since no new crimes were committed, 
Mr. Moss' probation was not threatening society. 
Additionally, there are mitigating factor's present which support the conclusion 
that the district court abused its discretion when it violated Mr. Moss' probation. 
Specifically, there is a nexus between Mr. Moss' bipolar disorder and the commission of 
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the underlying offenses. In State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 569-70 (2008), the Idaho 
Supreme Court held that even in instances where there is no nexus between a crime 
and the mental health issue(s), mental health evidence is relevant to sentence 
mitigation. Implicit in the foregoing is that the mitigating nature of mental health issues 
should be amplified when there is a nexus between the underlying offense the 
defendant's mental health problems. Here, Mr. Moss was diagnosed with bipolar 
disorder with psychotic features and suffers from hallucinations and depression. 
(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.11-12, 19.)3 Mr. Moss' 
recidivism risk is reduced when his mental health is properly treated. (PSI, pp.6-7, 14-
15, 389.) In fact, Mr. Moss performed well while on his rider and the IDOC 
recommended probation. (PSI, p.66.) Mr. Moss was suffering from a manic phase 
when committed his 2008 offense in docket number 38590. (PSI, pp.383-384.) During 
a manic state, Mr. Moss jumped off a roof in 2007, and had to undergo a hernia repair 
surgery as a result. (PSI, p.389.) Further, he attempted suicide after his grandmother 
died in 2001 and stabbed himself in the head when he was sixteen. (PSI, p.12.) 
According to his trial counsel: 
[T]here is clearly something wrong with him. He's been diagnosed as 
bipolar. There's a couple psychological evaluations in the presentence. 
I think the most telling is they said that, if he's not on his 
medication, there's a high likelihood of reoffending. 
3 There are three separate but identical electronic PSls in each case, therefore, the 
citations in this brief will not distinguish between docket numbers. Additionally, the PSI 
was submitted in a PDF format and contains various attachments, which were 
numbered consecutively. For ease of citation, the Appellant's Brief will adhere to the 
same pagination contained the PDF format, which begins with August 20, 2009, PSI 
and ends on page 607. 
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(02/08/11 Tr., p.42, Ls.19-24.) Since there is a nexus between Mr. Moss' mental health 
and the his commission of the underlying offenses this mitigating factor should be 
afforded greater weight. However, the district court expressly refused to Mr. Moss' 
mental health as a mitigating factor when it imposed the underlying sentence. (08/25/09 
Tr., p.30, Ls.18-25.) 
Additionally, Mr. Moss' family support is a mitigating factor. In State v. Shideler, 
103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982), the Idaho Supreme Court noted that support of family and 
friends were mitigating factors. Mr. Moss received letters from friends and family 
attesting to his good nature and pledging support. (R., pp.78, 93-94.) Mr. Moss' family 
support was also recognized by his trial counsel. (02/02/11 Tr., p.43, Ls.14-15.) 
Additionally, Mr. Moss' college education and employment should be considered 
a mitigating factor. Mr. Moss completed high school and enrolled in college courses at 
Boise State University. (PSI, pp.5-6.) Mr. Moss also has training in avalanche control, 
search and rescue, emergency health for winter, and swift water rescue. (PSI, p.465.) 
Mr. Moss' education and search and rescue related skills increase the likelihood he will 
be able to find employment upon his release from custody. The mitigating weight of this 
should be amplified because his offenses are financially motivated, and with 
employment he will have a reduced incentive to recidivate. 
Mr. Moss' troubled childhood should be considered as a mitigating factor. The 
Idaho Court of Appeals has recognized exposure to abuse during a defendant's 
childhood as a mitigating factor. State v. Williams, 135 Idaho 618, 620 (Ct. App. 2001 ). 
Mr. Moss' parents fought constantly and his father was alcoholic. (PSI, p.459.) 
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In sum, Mr. Moss' most recent probation violations where not as serious the 
underlying offenses. When this is considered in light of the mitigating factors it supports 
the conclusion that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation. 
111. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Reduce Mr. Moss' Unified 
Sentence Of Ten Years. With Five Years Fixed 1 Upon Revoking His Probation 
A Introduction 
The district court expressly disregarded Mr. Moss' mental health as a mitigating 
factor when it imposed the underlying sentence in docket number 38541. Since the 
Idaho Supreme Court has held that a criminal defendant's mental health is a mitigating 
factor, the district court's sentence was excessive as originally imposed. Therefore, the 
district court abused its discretion when it failed to honor Mr. Moss' request for a 
reduction of his sentence at the probation violation disposition hearing. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Reduce Mr. Moss' 
Unified Sentence Of Ten Years, With Five Years Fixed, Upon Revoking His 
Probation 
Mr. Moss asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of ten 
years, with five years fixed, is excessive. Due to the district court's power under I.C.R. 
35 to sua sponte reduce the length of the original sentence upon the revocation of 
probation, on appeal, an appellant can challenge the length of the sentence as being 
excessive. State v. Jensen, 138 Idaho 941, 944 (Ct. App. 2003). Where a defendant 
contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the 
appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record, giving consideration to 
the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public 
interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). In the context of an 
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appeal from an order revoking probation, "an appellate court will not consider whether 
the sentence was excessive when originally pronounced in the judgment of conviction" 
instead, "review is limited to whether the sentence was excessive in light of the 
circumstances existing when the court revoked probation." Jensen, 138 Idaho at 944 
(citing State v. Coffin, 122 Idaho 392, 393-94 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Paramore, 119 
Idaho 235, 236 (Ct. App. 1991 ); State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852 (Ct. App. 1983); 
State v. Tucker, 103 Idaho 885, 888 (Ct. App. 1982)) (emphasis in original). Further, 
when this Court reviews "a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of 
probation, [the Court] will examine the entire record encompassing events before and 
after the original judgment." State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28 (Ct. App. 2009). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Moss does not allege that his 
sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of 
discretion, Mr. Moss must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was 
excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. (citing State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 
141, 145 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385 (1992)). 
The governing criteria, or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of 
society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of 
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting State v. 
Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Coassolo, 136 
Idaho 138 (2001)). 
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As a preliminary matter, Mr. Moss would incorporate the arguments made in 
section ll(B), supra. 
The district court abused its discretion when it failed to consider Mr. Moss' mental 
health as a mitigating factor. At sentencing, the district court stated as follows: 
I have met other people that are bipolar. It doesn't cause greed, and it 
doesn't cause theft. It causes excess behavior, but it doesn't necessarily 
cause excess illegal behavior. 
So I do not see that as a justification or even an explanation. It is 
certainly something that has to be dealt with and should be dealt with. 
(08/25/09 Tr., p.30, Ls.18-25.) In Payne, supra, the Idaho Supreme Court held that 
mental health is a migrating factor, and implicitly held that the mitigating weight should 
be amplified when there is a nexus between a defendant's mental health and the 
commission of an offense. In this case a health examination was performed and it 
concluded that Mr. Moss posses a reduced risk to society when his mental health is 
treated. (PSI, pp.14-15.) Therefore, the mental health evaluations implicitly concluded 
that there is a link between Mr. Moss' mental health and his criminal behavior. 
Therefore, Mr. Moss' sentence was excessively harsh when it was originally imposed 
because he mental health was not considered. The district court should have honored 
Mr. Moss' request for a sentence reduction at the probation violation disposition 
hearing, because his mental health was argued as a mitigating factor at that hearing, 
and the district court did not consider it as a mitigating factor when it originally imposed 
his sentence. (02/0811 Tr., p.42, L.19-p.45, L.16.) 
In sum Mr. Moss' original sentence did not take his mental health into 
consideration and that factor should been considered at the probation violation 
disposition hearing. Therefore, the district court abused to reduce Mr. Moss' sentence 
at the probation violation disposition hearing. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Moss respectfully requests access to the requested transcript and the 
opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise 
as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Mr. Moss respectfully 
requests that this Court remand this matter with instruction for the district court to place 
Mr. Moss on probation with terms of probation it deems appropriate. Alternatively, 
Mr. Moss respectfully requests that this Court reduce the length of his fixed sentence in 
docket number 38541. 
DATED this 18th day of January, 2012. 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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